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The Third Wave in
Health Care Reform
David M. Cutler
Thet itle of this paper refers to a forecast of coming trends in health care
reform.Ib elieve a “third wave” of health care reform, focusing on improv-
ing the eﬃciency of medical care provision, will become common in the
countries of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) in the next ﬁve to ten years.
Id ate the ﬁrst wave of health care reform from the late 1940s through
the early 1980s. In this era, most OECD countries built up their health
insurance systems. Universal coverage was guaranteed, and beneﬁts were
expanded. Therew e r ef e wr e strictions on the provision of services. As a
result, medical spending consumed an increasing part of the economy of
every OECD country.
The growing cost of medical care led to the second wave of reform—a
focus on cost containment. The most obvious way to limit medical spend-
ing is to limit the total amount of resources the medical sector can con-
sume. Since governments in the OECD typically paid for most, if not all
of,m edical care spending, the government could easily limit its overall
cost. Spending limits did not conﬂict with the goal of universal insurance
coverage with low cost sharing. Thus, the 1980s saw the advent of wide-
scale restrictions on medical spending in the aggregate: global budgets for
hospitals, payments inversely related to volume increases for physicians,
and caps on pharmaceutical payments.
However, limiting spending without altering the underlying demand or
supply for medical care does not necessarily lead to eﬃcient service provi-
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169sion.I nmany countries, tight budget constraints have led to ineﬃcient
resource allocations and to a growing role for the private sector in supply-
ing care. Some countries have concluded—and I believe more will fol-
low—that additional reforms strengthening the market in medical care are
needed. I refer to this incipient trend as the third wave of health care reform.
In this paper, I document the trends in OECD medical systems over the
past ﬁfty years and the reasons for major changes in these systems.
5.1 The Organization of Medical Systems
Them edical sector is characterized by three economic agents, shown in
ﬁgure 5.1: patients, insurers, and providers. The dollars generally ﬂow from
left to right. Patients give money to insurers, who in turn pay providers.
There is some cost sharing that patients pay directly to providers, but this
is typically small. In the United States, for example, the typical private
insurance policy covers nearly 80 percent of medical spending; only 20
percent is paid out-of-pocket by the patient. In most other countries, the
insurers’ share of the bill is even greater.
Figure 5.1 depicts a fundamental representation of the medical sector.
This ﬁgure encompasses a broad range of insurance arrangements. For
example, the “patient” may be all taxpayers and the “insurer” may be the
government, in which case ﬁgure 5.1 depicts a national health insurance
scheme. Alternatively, the “insurer” and “provider” could be the same, as
in a health maintenance organization (HMO) in the United States or a
publicly run hospital in European countries. In both cases, one can distin-
guish among the three separate actors, even if more than one function
physically occurs in the same place.
In developed countries, the insurer is almost always the government, or,
in cases where insurance is private, it is heavily regulated by government.
This is not surprising; government involvement is required in any universal
beneﬁt system. Because of this, I conduct the rest of the discussion in
terms of the decisions that governments have historically made about the
medical sector.
5.2 The First Wave of Health Care Reform
Prior to World War II, few countries had universal health insurance
coverage. Social insurance as a whole dates back to Bismark in the 1880s,
buth e alth insurance coverage was always limited. Bismark’s Germany, for
example, covered the working age population, leaving the poor uncovered.
In only a few countries (Austria, Germany, the United Kingdom, the
Netherlands, France, and Norway) was any serious eﬀort at medical care
insurance adopted prior to World War II. The countries that did have some
coverage typically covered only certain groups in the population, such as
170 David M. Cutlerworkers or urban residents. Coverage was much more extensive for old-
age insurance than for medical care insurance (Cutler and Johnson 1999).
After World War II, medical insurance expanded. A wave of coun-
tries—generally the rich Northern European countries such as the United
Kingdom, Sweden, Belgium, and France—enacted universal insurance
coverage in the 1940s. The advent of modern medicine, most strikingly
illustrated by the penicillin antibiotic, drove demand for medical care to
some extent. These countries are also notable for a strong egalitarian ethic:
Health care is generally viewed as a basic right of all people, not as a good
to be allocated through markets. The legacy of the Great Depression and
WorldW ar II also fueled expanded coverage. Populations that had suﬀered
form ore than twenty years wanted some reward for their suﬀering, and
medical insurance was an appropriate reward.
Thel ate 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s saw the expansion of universal cover-
age. TheU nited Kingdom, for example, implemented universal coverage in
1948. France achieved universal coverage a few years later. Canada, Den-
mark, Iceland, Luxembourg, Japan, and Sweden all guaranteed universal
insurance coverage during the 1960s. The United States enacted Medicare
and Medicaid in the middle of the 1960s.
Forafewc ountries—Australia, Greece, Italy, and Portugal—the pro-
cess of ensuring universal coverage extended into the 1970s. The “laggard”
countries were typically poorer or had particular political situations (such
as authoritarian regimes) that set back the expansion of social insurance
for several decades.
By the 1980s insurance coverage had become universal in most devel-
oped countries. Twenty-two of the twenty-four OECD countries have uni-
versal insurance coverage.1 Only in the United States and Turkey is medi-
cal insurance voluntary.
1. This statement applies to most of the population; in some countries, certain groups
(such as guest workers) are not covered by health insurance. Switzerland only recently en-
acted universal insurance coverage, but it has had very generous subsidies to insurance, and
thus very high rates of insurance coverage, for several decades.
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Fig. 5.1 The organization of the medical sectorIn the United States, insurance coverage is spotty. For the elderly and
very poor, insurance is free or heavily subsidized. Thus, insurance is nearly
universal for the elderly and is high among the very poor. For the non-
elderly, non-poor population, insurance is subsidized, but to a lesser ex-
tent. The principal subsidy is that employer payments to health insurance
aren ot taxed as income to individuals in the way that wage payments are.
As a result, the subsidy to medical insurance varies with the employee’s
marginal tax rate—generally 15 to 40 percent once federal and state in-
come taxes and social security taxes are accounted for. This subsidy is
large enough that virtually everyone with private health insurance obtains
that insurance through an employer, but small enough that not everyone
chooses to be insured; about 15 percent of the U.S. population is without
health insurance.
Because countries began at diﬀerent points, the method of guaranteeing
universal coverage diﬀers internationally. There are two fundamental ways
of providing universal insurance. The ﬁrst is a tax model. Countries with
this system levy a payroll, income, or consumption tax, the proceeds of
whicha re used to ﬁnance universal insurance. In such a system, the “insur-
ance company” is the government. The second system is the insurance
model.2 Insurance is provided through regional associations, occupational
groups, or religious or political associations. Often, “employers” are re-
quired to pay for health insurance in such a system (although the incidence
of this is almost certainly on employees). Table 5.1 shows the division of
countries by system of insurance provision. The tax system is typiﬁed in
Canada, where the federal government raises a uniform tax that it distrib-
utes to the provinces to pay for medical costs. The insurance model is seen
most clearly in Germany, which has over 1,000 sickness funds varying by
region, industry, and occupation.
In practice, the distinction between tax and insurance systems is less
important than it could be. Countries that use the insurance model gener-
allyd on ot let people choose among alternative insurance companies. As
ar e sult, people are eﬀectively assigned to one insurance arrangement, as
in the tax-ﬁnanced model. The insurance companies are generally not-for-
proﬁt and are heavily regulated by the government, so that beneﬁts and
cost sharing do not vary across individuals.
As countries expanded their insurance coverage, they also expanded the
beneﬁts that people receive and reduced the cost sharing that people pay.
Table 5.2 shows the characteristics of the guaranteed insurance policy in
OECD countries.3 It is easier to show the services that are not covered
than those that are covered. Generally, almost all medical services are cov-
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2. Frequently, these insurance companies are termed sickness funds.
3. For the United States, I show the coverage under the federal Medicare program.ered. The few exceptions tend to be eyeglasses, some dental care, or certain
pharmaceuticals (generally less expensive ones, including some that are
available over the counter in the United States). Frequently, even these ser-
vices are covered for the very poor. Indeed, the services covered go far
beyondw hat most economists think of as insurance services; a classic ex-
ample is spa beneﬁts, which are covered under health insurance in some
countries (such as Germany).
Cost sharing is similarly low. Table 5.2 shows the cost sharing for visiting
ag e neral practitioner. In about half the countries, there is no cost sharing
for visiting a primary care physician. In most other countries, cost sharing
is nominal—perhaps $5 to $15 per visit—and these amounts are fre-
quently waived for the very poor. Specialist services (not shown) generally
arep rovided at the same levels of cost sharing. The out-of-pocket cost of
using medical care is, in most countries, trivial. Indeed, the United States,
whicheconomists frequently criticize for having a low amount of cost shar-
ing in its public programs, actually has very high cost sharing when com-
paredw itho ther OECD countries.4
The last column of table 5.2 shows whether each country imposes a
“gatekeeper” for access to specialty care. Typically, the gatekeeper is the
primary care physician, who must refer a patient to a specialist. Gatekeep-
4. Of course, this does not count the fact that most Medicare enrollees in the United States
have supplemental insurance that eliminates the cost sharing required under Medicare.
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Table 5.1 The Provision of Health Insurance
Mandatory
Tax Model Insurance Model Voluntary
Australia Austria Turkey













Source: Information on insurance systems is from the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD; 1995).ers are relatively common in OECD countries; however, it is important to
note that there is generally little ﬁnancial penalty for their primary care
physicians who make referrals to a specialists (unlike for HMO physicians
in the United States). Primary care physicians paid on a salary basis, for
example, bear no cost of authorizing a person to see a specialist. As a re-
sult, the gatekeeper provisions are generally much less onerous than they
are in the United States.
On the supply side of the market, governments must specify a payment
system for medical providers. There are many potential systems, shown in
ﬁgure 5.2: the most generous is fee-for-service payment. In this system, a
price is set for each service that providers can oﬀer, and providers receive
payment for the amount billed. Providers paid on a fee-for-service basis
are insulated from the cost of the services they provide (assuming the fee-
for-servicep a yment is above marginal cost). As a result, providers have
incentives to perform more services than are warranted.
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Table 5.2 Generosity of Insurance Coverage
Cost Sharing for Gatekeeper
Country Noncovered Services General Practitioner for Specialist
Australia Dental; pharmaceuticals $5 No
Austria Some dental; eyeglasses 10–20% Yes
Belgium — 25% No
Canada Dental; pharmaceuticals; — Yes
eyeglasses
Denmark — — Yes
Finland — $17 No
France Dental; eyeglasses 25% No
Germany — — No
Greece — — No
Iceland — $9 Yes
Ireland — — Yes
Italy — — Yes
Japan Innoculations; eyeglasses 10–30% No
Luxembourg — 5% No
The Netherlands Eyeglasses — Yes
New Zealand Dental; eyeglasses — Yes
Norway — $11 Yes
Portugal Some pharmaceuticals — Yes
Spain — — Yes
Sweden Some pharmaceuticals $6–$19 No
Switzerland Dental; eyeglasses 10% No
United Kingdom Dental; eyeglasses — Yes
United States Pharmaceuticals; long- 20% above No
term care; dental; $100 deductible
eyeglasses
Source: OECD (1995).
Note: Long dash indicates “none.”A somewhat tighter system is a salary payment.5 Salaried physicians
receive an annual payment, with their practice expenses covered by the
insurer. While physicians are not paid for performing additional medical
care, they also have no ﬁnancial incentive to limit the care they provide.6
Systems that place the provider at risk for medical care utilization are
on the right-hand side of the ﬁgure. These are grouped under the term
capitation, although there are many variants of such a system. One type
of payment is a per diem in which a hospital receives a ﬁxed amount for
each day the patient is in the hospital. Hospitals bear the cost for patients
whoa re more expensive than the per diem amount, but, conversely, make
money on patients who are less expensive than the per diem amount. Not
surprisingly, hospital stays are long in countries with per diem payments,
since marginal days of care are less resource intensive than the average day
of care.Ar elated system is a per-case payment. In this system, the hospital
is paid a ﬁxed amount for the patient as a whole. Thus, the marginal costs
of all services provided is borne by the hospital. Hospital stays generally
fall as payment moves from a per diem or fee-for-service basis to a per-
case basis (Cutler and Zeckhauser 1999). A ﬁnal alternative is a per-year
payment—a “global budget” for all hospital services provided during the
year,o ra nannual fee to physicians that covers their salary and practice
expenses. In these systems, providers are at even greater risk for the costs
of the services that they provide. Money spent for one patient reduces
money available for other patients or reduces physician take-home earn-
ings. The exact level of risk varies with the nature of the capitation pay-
ment.7
Historically, medical providers in virtually every country were paid on
af ee-for-service or salary basis. In part, this has been a response to the
complexity of the medical care system. Medical care is an extremely dif-
ﬁcult commodity to price. There are about 10,000 services that physicians
canp rovide, and thousands more for hospitals. Since governments are
rarely specialists in the provision of medical care, they must ﬁgure out
5. This system is relevant only for physicians (not for hospitals).
6. They also have few incentives to work hard where it is diﬃcult to monitor their work
hours or their eﬀort.
7. This includes any additional payment for “outlier” patients.
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Fig. 5.2 Payment systems for medical carehow to pay for these varied services. Paying piece rates or salaries is more
natural than capitated payment where knowledge of medical care delivery
is important. Thus, many countries started oﬀ with piece rates or salaried
reimbursement.
Theu se of fee-for-service and salaried payments has also been, in part,
ar e sponse to concerns about the underprovision of services if marginal
costs were not covered. In the United States, for example, the Medicare
system was set up with a fee-for-service payment structure for exactly that
reason; it was the only way to blunt the fears of doctors that their incomes
would be reduced if they were to use an alternate pricing system. In other
countries, a similar dynamic was at work.
Ther e sult was that there were few incentives to limit utilization. In es-
sentially no country were supply-side constraints important in limiting
medical care provision. This circumstance was coupled with the already
weak incentives on the demand side to limit utilization.
By the beginning of the 1980s, therefore, most countries had a medical
care system characterized by three features, each of which strongly encour-
aged the growth of medical costs:
● Universal insurance coverage;
● Ag e n e r o u ss e to fbeneﬁts, with low cost sharing; and
● Fee-for-service or salaried providers who faced no ﬁnancial incentives
to limit care provision.
In eﬀect, the systems were unconstrained on both the demand and the
supply sides of the market. In such a system, one might naturally expect
costs to grow rapidly; this was indeed the case. Table 5.3 shows the growth
of medical costs in the Group of Seven (G7) nations and in the remainder
of the OECD nations between 1960 and 1980. Between 1960 and 1980,
medical spending for the average OECD country increased from 4.1 per-
cent of GDP to 7.4 percent. In the G7 countries, growth was particularly
rapid; in the United States, for example, medical care increased from 5.3
percent of GDP to 9.2 percent of GDP.
Some of the growth of medical spending as a share of GDP may be due
to the growth of the economy as a whole. If the income elasticity of medi-
calc arei sg reater than 1, or if increases in income increase the opportunity
cost of resources in the medical sector and thus increase overall medical
spending (Baumol 1988), one would naturally expect medical care to ex-
pand as a share of GDP as the economy grows. To adjust for this, I esti-
mate a regression for the growth of real per capita medical spending be-
tween 1960 and 1980 as a function of real per capita income growth. For
the twenty-one OECD countries with data in both years, the coeﬃcient on
income growth is 1.26 (standard error  0.22). Thus, at least some of the
growth of medical spending as a share of GDP is to be expected.
Still, the third column of table 5.3 shows the growth of residual medical
176 David M. Cutlerspending—medical spending growth beyond what can be explained by the
growth of income alone. As the table shows, residual spending growth was
generally 2.0 to 2.5 percent annually in the G7, and averaged 2.3 percent
in the OECD countries. The only countries with residual growth rates be-
low 2 percent annually are Canada and the United Kingdom, both of
whichh a dal onger history of cost containment, as noted below.
5.3 The Second Wave
At the beginning of the 1980s, countries throughout the OECD became
concerned about spending on medical care. Public-sector concern was fu-
eled by the large drain that medical costs placed on the public ﬁsc. Gov-
ernments paid for over 70 percent of medical costs in most countries. Be-
ginning in the mid-1970s, the growth of wages, and thus the tax base,
slowed; as the 1980s progressed, it became clearer to governments that
they had a long-term funding crisis in medical care. Employers also be-
came concerned about health care costs, particularly when employers
wrote the checks for health insurance. In the United States, for example,
employer concern about rising health costs was instrumental in driving
reform. The general public also grew weary of rising costs, which led to
ever-increasing tax burdens and less rapidly increasing wages.
As a result, the 1980s saw a concerted eﬀort toc o n t r o lm e d i c al spending
in most developed countries. Table 5.4 shows the particular measures
taken in the G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United King-
dom, and the United States). The most common reform was to place limits
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Table 5.3 Medical Spending between 1960 and 1980
MedicalCare/ Growth of Residual
GDP Medical Spending
(%) (%)
Country 1960 1980 1960–80 1980–90
Canada 5.5 7.4 0.7 1.9
France 4.2 7.6 2.0 1.2
Germany 4.8 8.4 2.0 0.7
Italy 3.6 6.9 2.2 0.8
Japan 2.9 6.4 2.5 0.7
United Kingdom 3.9 5.8 1.5 0.2
United States 5.3 9.2 2.2 2.3
OECD Average 4.1 7.4 2.3 0.4
Source: OECD (1998).
Notes: Residual medical spending for 1960–80 is the growth of medical spending beyond the
rate predicted by the increase in income. Residual medical spending for 1980–90 uses the in-
come elasticity estimated for the 1960–80 period.on overall medical spending. Since the government was paying for medical
care, the simplest way the government could control overall spending was
simply to limit aggregate spending for medical care.
This was most easily accomplished in the hospital sector. Rather than
paying hospitals on a fee-for-service basis, countries moved toward a
global payment for each hospital (termed a global budget)w h i ch was to
cover all the care that was appropriate. Global budgets were implemented
in France in 1984 (for public hospitals only) and in Germany in 1986. The
United Kingdom, Canada, and Italy already had global budgets in
place—they had been established with universal coverage—but both
countries tightened their budgets in the 1980s, nonetheless. Among the
universal insurance countries, only Japan did not move away from fee-for-
servicep a yment; instead, the fee schedule for hospitals in Japan was re-
duced.
Table 5.5 shows that this experience was not unusual. Most countries
nowp ay hospitals on some type of capitated basis. Only a few countries
have retained a fee-for-service payment system.
Limiting physician spending is more diﬃcult, since full capitation for
physicians makes much less sense than it does for hospitals—the risk to a
physician in bearing the cost per year of a patient are simply too great.
Table 5.4 The Medical Care Experience in the 1980s and 1990s
Country Reforms (1980s) Current Issues
Canada Global budgets for hospitals established Cost containment; eﬃciency
with universal coverage
France Global budgets for hospitals Costs; eﬃciency; diﬀerence
Creation of “Sector 2” (allowing between public and private
balance billing) for physicians sectors
Tighter fee schedules for physicians
Germany Global budgets for hospitals Costs; eﬃciency; competition
Aggregate fee limits on physicians among sickness funds
(enforced by reducing fee-for-service
payments)
Italy Reduce hospital funding Waiting lists (rich opt out); low
Move to diagnosis related group quality; costs
payment system for hospitals
Limit federal subsidies
JapanR educef ee schedules Costs; eﬃciency; aging
Increase copayments
United Kingdom Capitation of some general practitioners Waiting lists (rich opt out);
(fundholders) quality
Competition among hospitals (trusts)
United States Prospective payment for hospitals Universal insurance coverage;
Fees chedule for physicians public-sector costs
Source: See Cutler (1999) for more details.
Note: Reformsi nthe United States are for Medicare.
178 David M. CutlerTable 5.6 shows how countries reduced payments for physician services,
however. A few countries have capitated physicians, but this typically in-
volves a salary payment that depends on the number of patients seen, not
a system where primary care physicians bear the risks of individual patient
costs.8 More commonly, countries have implemented “global budgets” for
the physician sector as a whole. In Canada and Germany, for example,
aggregate payments for physicians are set in advance; payments for each
individual physician are made on a fee-for-service basis, but the fees are
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Source: Information on insurance systems is from OECD (1995).
Table 5.5 Methods of Hospital Payment
Fee-for-service Per Diem Per Case Per Year
JapanA ustria Belgium Australia
Switzerland Belgium France (public) Canada











Source: Information on insurance systems is from OECD (1995).
Note: TheU nited States is placed in the per-case column because that is how Medicare pays
forh o spital care.
aHospitals run by the public sector.
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8. Although in the United States, capitation in the form of global budgets is used.reduced if the aggregate volume of services provided exceeds the expected
level. Other countries introduced fee schedules (as did the United States)
or,a si nthe case of Japan, retained fee schedules but proceeded to lower
the rates. In countries with salaried physicians (public-sector physicians in
France and specialists in Italy and the United Kingdom), salaries grew
lessr a pidly than they had in previous decades.
Ther e sult was a decade of relatively low medical-spending growth. The
last column of Table 5.3 shows the growth of residual medical spending
from 1980 to 1990, using the same income elasticity as in the 1960–80
period. That is, I report the growth of medical spending net of the amount
predicted, given income growth that decade and the historical relation be-
tween growth in income and increases in medical spending.
In most countries, residual medical-spending growth was substantially
lower in the 1980s than it had been in previous decades. In Germany and
Japan, for example, residual spending growth was negative in the 1980s—
medical spending increased less rapidly than income alone would dictate.
In the United Kingdom and Italy, residual spending growth was positive
butv ery small. Only in the United States and Canada was residual
medical-spending growth close to what itsv alue had been in the previous
twenty years. In Canada this is understandable, since many cost contain-
ment initiatives had been implemented prior to the 1980s and the strin-
gency with which limits were applied was generally reduced in the 1980s.
TheU nited States is the clear outlier. With no clear demand- or supply-
side restraints, residual spending growth in the 1980s grew as rapidly as
residual growth had during the 1960s and 1970s.
5.4 The Third Wave
Has the rest of the world (outside of the United States) discovered the
answer? Are countries in long-run balance on their medical care systems,
or aref urther reforms required? In this section, I speculate about future
trends in health care reform.
It is clear that people in most countries are much happier with their
medical care systems than are people in the United States. Blendon et al.
(1990) reported on surveys of satisfaction with the health system in ten
countries, including all of the G7 countries. The share of individuals who
feel that only minor changes are needed in their health system9 was 56
percent in Canada, 41 percent in France and Germany, 29 percent in Ja-
pan, 27 percent in the United Kingdom, and 12 percent in Italy. This com-
pares to1 0p e r c e n ti nt h eUnited States.
Although people in most countries are more satisﬁed with their medical
9. The exact question was “On the whole, the health care system works pretty well, and
only minor changes are necessary to make it work better.”
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bero fp eople in every country who still want fundamental reform of the
health system. Only in Canada did as many as 40 percent of the popula-
tion think that the structure of the health system was sound; and in Can-
ada, the share of people favoring fundamental reform of the medical care
system has risen in recent years (Blendon et al. 1995).
The last column of table 5.4 shows the concerns that have arisen in G7
countries in the 1990s, particularly in the past few years. Despite lower
overall spending growth, many countries are still concerned about medical
costs. This is not surprising; even at its lower growth rate, medical care is
consuming an increasing share of GDP—and public spending—in most
countries. Moreover, the prices that have been paid for the less-rapid
growth of medicalc o sts have been high.
As e c o n dc oncern has risen to match the overall level of spending: the
eﬃciency of the medical sector. Recall that medical care reforms in the
1980s did not reduce the underlying demand for medical care. Even after
the 1980s, patients still faced little or no cost sharing for the use of covered
services.T he “rationing” of medical care was entirely on the supply side.
Supply-side rationing has predictable consequences, the most common
of whicha re waiting lists. Waiting lists are common in Canada, Italy, and
the United Kingdom. In Japan, although waiting lists are not common,
excess demand for physicians is; the time involved in seeing a physician
can beq u i te high.
Countries that spend more have shorter waiting lists than countries that
spend less. Waiting lists are more common in the United Kingdom, for
example, than in Canada, reﬂecting the greater level of medical care fund-
ing in the latter country than in the former.
Coupled with this excess demand is the diﬃculty of eﬃcient planning
in the public sector. Governments are rarely good at providing complex
services,a nd this is particularly true in medical care, where the nature of
optimal service provision changes very rapidly. Thus, medical care quality
in supply-side rationing was uneven—good in some places and bad in
others. Moreover, the incentives built into the systems became more no-
ticeable. Salaried physicians did not work hard, and physicians who were
paid little money for each visit did not spend much time with each patient.
The levels of funding and of the eﬃciency with which funds were allo-
cated showed up directly in patient satisfaction with the medical care sys-
tem. Cutler (1999) shows that the share of people expressing the need for
fundamental health reform (based on the Blendon et al. survey) is strongly
positively correlated with per capita medical spending. With the exception
of the United States, countries that spend more on medical care have
greater public satisfaction with the medical care system than countries that
spend less on medical care. In the United States, in fact, the concern about
the medical system probably refers more to the lack of universal coverage
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versal coverage, the level of medical spending is strongly related to satis-
faction with the medical system.
When waiting times are long and quality in the public sector is particu-
larly low, the private sector is often the alternative source of medical care.
Thea bility to go outside the national medical system varies across coun-
tries; some countries place restrictions on doing so, or oﬀer inducements
to stay in the national system. In Canada, for example, providers are not
allowed to treat patients outside the national system for services the sys-
tem covers, nor are they allowed to accept payments above the insured
level.
In other countries, however, a robust private sector has developed to
supplement the public system. This is the case in the United Kingdom,
Italy, and France. In the United Kingdom, for example, a growing private
insurance market allows people to “queue jump” to receive services more
rapidly than they would be eligible for them under the national insurance
system. In Italy, people also go outside the public system, paying out of
pocket when they want services they cannot obtain rapidly enough
through the public sector. In France, the issue of private provision has
been particularly contentious. Some providers may see patients outside the
public sector, which they do to increase their income. The result is that the
rich get better (or at least faster) medical care than the poor.
The anecdotal information from the G7 suggests that supply-limited
systems are not the ultimate resolution of the medical care struggle. Tight
spending constraints reduce medical spending but also engender increas-
ing dissatisfaction. It seems likely that further medical care reforms will
be needed. As a result, a new round of reform eﬀorts across countries may
well begin. My suspicion is that reforms are likely to proceed on two
tracks, which I discuss in the following subsections.
5.4.1 Measures to Increase Competition
One focus of reform eﬀorts will be on increasing competition in the
medical care system, in an eﬀortt oincrease system eﬃciency. Almost cer-
tainly, this will involve more cost consciousness on the part of physicians.
TheU nited Kingdom is at the forefront here. In the late 1980s and early
1990s, the United Kingdom began capitation payments for physicians
(“GP fundholders”). The capitation amount included primary care ser-
vices as well as specialist and hospital services. At the same time, hospitals
were encouraged to become, in eﬀect, not-for-proﬁt “trusts” that could
compete for patients. The result is incentives for providers to monitor utili-
zation more closely and to limit excessive medical care.
In other countries, there has been less emphasis on competition among
providers than on competition among insurers. For example, Germany
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may choosea mong insurance companies in the United States. The hope is
thatc ompetition among funds will encourage the diﬀerent funds to be
more eﬃcient.10
The issue of choice brings up a fundamental question about health in-
surance markets: Are the eﬃciency advantages of choice greater than the
losses it brings about through adverse selection? While insurance choice is
likely to lead toe ﬃciency savings, it also creates adverse selection (Cutler
and Reber 1998; Cutler and Zeckhauser 1999). As people sort themselves
across insurance plans, the sickest people will choose the most generous
insurance and the healthiest people will choose the least generous insur-
ance. This will increase the premiums for the sick and reduce the premi-
ums for the healthy, and may even lead to the abandonment of the most
generous plans. Adverse selection is an inherent tendency of choice-based
insurance systems (Cutler and Zeckhauser 1999). Thus, countries that
move along this route will necessarily give up some of the redistribution
that they currently maintain.
5.4.2 Increasing Patient Cost Sharing
Theo ther avenue for change will be reducing beneﬁts or increasing pa-
tientc ost sharing. As supply-side constraints alone become less popular,
demand-side controls will be an increasing option. In some countries (e.g.,
Japan), reforms in the 1980s increased cost sharing for covered services.
Cost sharing has been increasing in the United States as well as for some
services in other countries.
Countries that increase cost sharing face the question of whether people
will be allowed to purchase supplemental insurance to buy down that cost
sharing. In many countries (including the United States), supplemental
insurance is allowed to cover the cost sharing required under the basic
package. This creates signiﬁcant problems, however; when individuals
purchase supplemental insurance, they use more medical services than
they otherwise would, driving up spending in the basic medical plan. Thus,
allowing insurance to cover basic cost sharing is likely to limit the eﬃ-
ciency gains of increasing cost sharing.
In addition, increasing cost sharing raises concerns about the poor. The
rich can aﬀordg reater cost sharing more readily than the poor can. Thus,
countries that move toward increased cost sharing or fewer covered ser-
vices inevitably face questions about their commitment to equity in medi-
calc are ﬁnancing.
10. The model here is the recent reform in the Netherlands, which involved substantial
competition among insurers.
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The world’s medical systems have been in ﬂux for most of the past ﬁfty
years. At ﬁrst, countries built up their medical care systems. Coverage was
made universal, and beneﬁts were generous. There was little demand- or
supply-side cost sharing.
In the early 1980s, countries realized the unaﬀordability of generous
demand incentives with no control over medical care supply. The typical
response was to limit the supply side of the market by capping the total
amount of services that could be provided. Given most countries’ commit-
ment to universal insurance and low cost sharing, supply-side restrictions
were the logical response. This response saved money; the 1980s were char-
acterized by much lower growth of medical costs than had taken place
during the previous twenty years.
However, the strains in this approach ultimately became apparent. Ex-
cess demand led to waiting lists, non-pricing rationing, and the incentive
to seeks ervices outside the public sector. As a result, eﬃciency concerns
rose in importance during the 1980s and 1990s.
Af ocus on eﬃciency is likely to involve two reforms, which I character-
ize as the “third wave” of health care reform: increased competition for
services,e i ther at the level of the provider or at the level of the insurer;
and increased patient cost sharing. Neither of these is an easy reform to
implement. Increased competition increases the incentives for adverse se-
lection; increased cost sharing is more burdensome for the poor than for
the rich. Nonetheless countries are ﬁnding, or are likely to ﬁnd, they have
no alternative but to try these reforms.
This debate between demand-side and supply-side limits is, in my esti-
mation, the next great debate in the medical sector. Countries cannot have
unlimited demand and unlimited supply, nor can they eﬀectively rely on
supply-side controls alone. What sort of demand-side controls they imple-
ment, and how they manage the inherent inequities in these systems, will
determine the shape of medical care systems for the early part of the
twenty-ﬁrst century.
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